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The ultimatum game (UG) is widely used to study human bargaining behavior and
fairness norms. In this game, two players have to agree on how to split a sum of money.
The proposer makes an offer, which the responder can accept or reject. If the responder
rejects, neither player gets anything. The prevailing view is that, beyond self-interest, the
desire to equalize both players’ payoffs (i.e., fairness) is the crucial motivation in the
UG. Based on this view, previous research suggests that fairness is a short-run oriented
motive that conflicts with the long-run goal of self-interest. However, competitive spite,
which reflects an antisocial (not norm-based) desire to minimize others’ payoffs, can
also account for the behavior observed in the UG, and has been linked to short-
run, present-oriented aspirations as well. In this paper, we explore the relationship
between individuals’ intertemporal preferences and their behavior in a citywide dual-
role UG experiment (N = 713). We find that impatience (short-run orientation) predicts
the rejection of low, “unfair” offers as responder and the proposal of low, “unfair”
offers as proposer, which is consistent with spitefulness but inconsistent with fairness
motivations. This behavior systematically reduces the payoffs of those who interact with
impatient individuals. Thus, impatient individuals appear to be keen to minimize their
partners’ share of the pie, even at the risk of destroying it. These findings indicate
that competitively reducing other’s payoffs, rather than fairness (or self-interest), is the
short-run goal in ultimatum bargaining.
Keywords: ultimatum game, costly punishment, delay discounting, impatience, fairness, competitive spite
Introduction
The ultimatum game (UG) is an economic experimental set-up widely used to study the nature
of human bargaining and the enforcement of fairness norms (Güth et al., 1982; Sanfey et al.,
2003; Henrich et al., 2005, 2006). In this game, the ﬁrst player (the proposer) proposes how to
split a sum of money with the second player (the responder). The responder can either accept or
reject the proposal. If the proposal is accepted, the “pie” is divided accordingly; if rejected, neither
player is paid. Economic models based on narrow self-interest predict that the responder should
accept any positive oﬀer, at least in non-repeated interactions. By backward induction, the proposer
should oﬀer the smallest positive amount to the responder, and the latter will accept the deal.
Assuming money-maximizing players, these patterns of behavior constitute the subgame perfect
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equilibrium of the one-shot UG. However, experimental evidence
has consistently contradicted these predictions as responders very
often reject “unfair,” albeit positive oﬀers and most proposers
oﬀer “fair,” equal splits (Camerer, 2003).
Explaining proposers’ generous oﬀers is straightforward from
a strategic viewpoint: since a low oﬀer will likely be rejected, it
is in the proposer’s self-interest to make a high oﬀer to avoid
coming out empty-handed (Roth et al., 1991; Wells and Rand,
2013). Strategic reasoning does not apply, however, to responders’
observed behavior if future encounters with the same proposer
are unlikely (otherwise, rejections might be used to encourage
higher future oﬀers). Most scholars have invoked normative,
fairness-based rationales for the existence of rejections (and
fair oﬀers) in one-shot interactions: people dislike unfairness—
deﬁned in either simple forms like mere payoﬀ inequality (Fehr
and Schmidt, 1999; Bolton andOckenfels, 2000) ormore complex
ones like intentional unfairness (“unkindness”) (Rabin, 1993;
Charness and Rabin, 2002). In this vein, the rejection of a low
oﬀer is considered as an act of costly punishment implemented
by fair-minded individuals.
Therefore, the mainstream view is that the decision making
of both proposers and responders in the one-shot UG relies
on a combination of (strategic) self-interest and fairness-based
considerations. Less attention has been paid, however, to other
motivations like (psychological) spite, the “ugly twin” of altruism,
as a crucial force underlying observed behavior in either role
of the UG. For a spiteful individual, other individuals are
competitors whose payoﬀs negatively aﬀect her own utility;
that is, the welfare of other individuals enters negatively in
her utility function (e.g., Kirchsteiger, 1994; Levine, 1998;
see Fehr and Schmidt, 2006, for a review of other-regarding
preferences models)1. Promoting the other party’s displeasure
rather than one’s own beneﬁt is indeed traditionally regarded as
a fundamental goal in bargaining, very often leading negotiations
to collapse (Loewenstein et al., 1989).
Delay Discounting and Social Behavior
Recently, delay discounting (DD) is being used to assess the
motivations behind social behavior (Curry et al., 2008; Crockett
et al., 2010; Espín et al., 2012). DD measures individuals’
preferences for smaller-sooner over larger-later reward (see
reviews in Frederick et al., 2002; Green and Myerson, 2004;
Luhmann, 2009). Such intertemporal preferences are fairly stable
within individuals across time (Kirby, 2009). If a speciﬁc choice
involves trading oﬀ short-run and long-run incentives, those
1Technically speaking, in order for an agent to be deﬁned as spiteful, it is required
that the ﬁrst derivative of his/her utility with respect to others’ payoﬀs is always
negative, irrespective of both their behavior and the payoﬀ distribution: the “more
negative” the impact of others’ payoﬀs on utility the more spiteful the individual.
Therefore, we refer to spite (also referred to as spitefulness; see Fehr and Schmidt,
2006) as a proximate motivation to reduce others’ payoﬀs in order to increase
one’s own utility. The maximization of the individual’s relative payoﬀ (own payoﬀ
minus other’s payoﬀ), emanating from competitive preferences or a competitive
value orientation (Messick and McClintock, 1968; Van Lange et al., 1997; Charness
and Rabin, 2002), could thus be considered as a particular form of spite. Note,
however, that in some research areas, spite is often used to refer to those behaviors
that merely impose a cost on others, regardless of whether reducing others’ payoﬀs
is the actual motivation (that is, the functional approach). See Jensen (2010) for a
discussion on the diﬀerent deﬁnitions of spite.
individuals who discount the future more heavily (i.e., short-
run oriented, impatient individuals with a high rate of DD)
tend to favor the former over the latter. Outside the arena of
social behavior, there are many well-studied examples of how
experimentally elicited DD predicts decision making in ﬁeld
situations that involve intertemporal trade-oﬀs (Kirby et al., 1999;
Chabris et al., 2008; Meier and Sprenger, 2012).
In the speciﬁc context of the one-shot UG, Crockett et al.
(2010) found that higher DD (impatience) of responders,
as measured by their choices in a standard task involving
hypothetical monetary reward, predicts higher rejection rates.
Under the traditional interpretation of the UG as a conﬂict
between self-interest and fairness, this result suggests that
short-run psychological incentives (costs or beneﬁts), such as
immediate negative emotions (Pillutla and Murnighan, 1996;
Sanfey et al., 2003; Van’t Wout et al., 2006) or psychological
satisfaction (de Quervain et al., 2004), underlie the decision
to impose fairness at a personal cost. Accordingly, promoting
long-run material self-interest would require overriding the
immediate, very likely emotional, impulse to punish violations of
fairness norms (see also Tabibnia et al., 2008, for brain imaging
results interpreted in this direction). Thus, ultimatum bargaining
might encompass a conﬂict between the short-run goal of fairness
and the long-run goal of self-interest. That is, while fairness could
trigger immediate satisfaction, the maximization of one’s own
payoﬀ could to be related to long-run satisfaction2.
Yet other interpretations are possible. Espín et al. (2012)
found that high DD is characteristic of free-riders who pay
a cost to punish other free-riders in a one-shot public goods
game. Free-riders’ punishment of other free-riders is considered
to be motivated by competitive spite (i.e., spite emanating
from positional concerns) because it increases the punisher’s
relative standing and is hardly reconcilable with the moralistic
or fairness-based motives which are assumed to be behind
cooperators’ punishment of free-riders (Shinada et al., 2004; Falk
et al., 2005; Eldakar et al., 2007). According to such a multi-
dimensional interpretation of punishment behavior (Falk et al.,
2005; Gächter andHerrmann, 2009), this ﬁnding suggests that the
punishment decisions which respond to short-run psychological
forces are not based on fairness but rather on competitive
spite. However, those forces apparently have nothing to do with
emotional reactions to aversive stimuli (since, prior to punishing,
a free-rider has experienced neither an unfair treatment nor a
disadvantageous relative position) but are instead linked to the
personal satisfaction of outcompeting others, which can operate
as a short-run incentive.
Since the rejection of a low oﬀer in the UG both imposes
the fairness norm and increases the relative standing of
the responder, rejections could be driven by either fairness
(normative) or spiteful (competitive) desires (Kirchsteiger, 1994;
Carpenter, 2003; Falk et al., 2003). Thus, similarly to punishment
behavior in the public goods game, looking exclusively at the
rejection behavior of an individual is not enough to unequivocally
2As Crockett et al. (2010, p. 870) point out, “[. . .] the emotional satisfaction derived
from punishing (e.g., rejecting an unfair oﬀer) is immediate, while the monetary
beneﬁt of not punishing (e.g., accepting an unfair oﬀer) is delayed until the end of
the experiment.”
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infer her motives. Individuals’ strategies should be more broadly
analyzed. In light of the ﬁndings of Crockett et al. (2010),
where impatient subjects were more likely to reject low oﬀers,
and of Espín et al. (2012), where impatient punishers behaved
uncooperatively themselves, a direct way to solve the puzzle is by
looking into whether the “impatient responders” comply with the
fairness norm when playing as proposers.
Hypotheses
In this paper, we address this issue by analyzing how individuals’
DD relates to their behavior in both roles of the one-shot UG.
If impatient subjects are found to reject low, unfair oﬀers as
responders and to propose high, fair oﬀers as proposers, it can
be argued that fairness goals respond to short-run incentives in
the context of the UG. Hence:
Hypothesis 1 states that short-run orientation predicts fairness-
based behavior in ultimatum bargaining.
Indeed, fairness—either observed or imposed—is
psychologically rewarding (de Quervain et al., 2004; Tabibnia
et al., 2008; Crockett et al., 2013; see Tabibnia and Lieberman,
2007, for a review) and fair outcomes have been shown to
activate various areas in the neural circuitry of reward (e.g., the
striatum and the orbitofrontal cortex) which are typically also
engaged in the computation of the subjective value of diﬀerent
alternatives when individuals make intertemporal decisions (e.g.,
Kable and Glimcher, 2007). According to Hypothesis 1, fair
outcomes would be linked to non-monetary values (considered
to function as motivational incentives; see Ruﬀ and Fehr, 2014)
that are perceived to be arising sooner, or to be less lasting,
than those linked to other outcomes of the UG—such as, for
instance, earning some money through the acceptance of a
low oﬀer or dominating the other player by means of oﬀering
her a low amount. So, deciding between diﬀerent alternatives
would require the evaluation of short- (fairness-related) and
long-run satisfaction sources (possibly linked to self-interest).
Such evaluation would lead impatient individuals to behavemore
fairly than patient individuals in both roles of the game.
On the other hand, it is known that the individuals’
payoﬀs relative to others rather than in absolute terms are
associated with activation in reward areas of the brain (mainly
striatal) when social interactions take place in competitive
frameworks (Fliessbach et al., 2007; Dvash et al., 2010; Bault
et al., 2011; Lindner et al., 2014), where there are positional
or status concerns. Hence, for individuals interacting in a
competitive environment, all things equal, satisfaction increases
as the counterpart’s payoﬀ decreases, meaning that reducing
other’s payoﬀs should be psychologically rewarding. Bargaining
processes might indeed create such an environment (Loewenstein
et al., 1989). If these competition-based hedonic feelings (i.e., the
satisfaction derived from outcompeting others) represent short-
run incentives in the context of the UG, we would expect that
in both roles of the game impatient subjects display spite-based
behavior that reduces their partners’ payoﬀs, that is, they would
reject low oﬀers as responders and make low oﬀers themselves as
proposers. Hence:
Hypothesis 2 states that short-run orientation predicts spite-
based behavior in ultimatum bargaining.
In short, this hypothesis builds on Espín et al.’s (2012)
ﬁndings and argues that the decision to play the UG harshly
responds to the short-run hedonic value that individuals derive
from outdoing others3. This behavior would make impatient
individuals less likely to reach an agreement with their partners,
thus risking the destruction of the pie for the sake of reducing the
other party’s payoﬀ.
This same behavior, however, cannot only be explained by
spiteful preferences but also in terms of the ability of individuals
to maximize their own payoﬀs, in particular, to strategically adapt
their own decisions to the behavior of others. Strategic behavior
may require cognitive and computational abilities. That is, it
could be that impatience goes along with a diminished capacity
to anticipate that oﬀering a low amount (as a proposer) will
potentially lead to a rejection and that setting a high punishment
threshold (as a responder) means losing potential earnings.
In fact, impatience has been related to low cognitive abilities
(e.g., Burks et al., 2009; Dohmen et al., 2010). In such a case,
impatient subjects would adopt less adaptive strategies, thus
earning lower payoﬀs than the average due to their inability
to anticipate others’ decisions4. Conversely, spiteful preferences
are not focused on achieving a particular payoﬀ for oneself
but instead on reducing others’ payoﬀs. Thus, if spite is indeed
what underlies the decisions of impatient subjects, we might
observe that it is not the impatient subjects themselves but rather
their interacting partners who end up with low payoﬀs. An
analysis of the subjects’ earnings will allow us to explore this
issue.
Empirical Strategy
To test these hypotheses we analyze data from a citywide
survey-experiment (see Exadaktylos et al., 2013, for a detailed
description), which contains a dual-role UG and a measurement
of participants’ intertemporal preferences. All participants
[N = 713 ﬁnal observations, 386 females, average age 36.7± 16.6
(SD)] were inhabitants of Granada, Spain. The sample consisted
of participants aged 16 years and over and it was representative
in terms of the geographical location of households within the
city, as well as age and gender of the population. Participants
made their experimental decisions anonymously from their
own households in the presence of two monitors. Their
(mathematical) cognitive abilities, risk preferences and extensive
socio-economic information were also gaged [see Supporting
Information (SI)].
The participants completed two complementary DD subtasks
with six decisions each. The ﬁrst subtask involved a 1-day delay,
whereas the second implied a 6-months delay. The intertemporal
3In the Section “Discussion,” we provide an alternative (but not exclusive) rationale
that does not strictly require the desire to reduce others’ payoﬀs to be associated
with short-run satisfaction. Instead, it is argued there that adaptation to particular
living conditions might result in the selection of present-oriented and spiteful
preferences separately.
4Note that the behavior predicted by Hypothesis 1 for impatient proposers (i.e.,
making a fair oﬀer) can be accounted for by strategic self-interest as well, but
the behavior predicted for impatient responders (i.e., setting a high punishment
threshold) cannot. So, only the predictions of Hypothesis 2 are congruent with
the existence of diﬀerences between patient and impatient individuals in terms of
strategic adaptation.
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preferences elicited over these delays will be referred to hereafter
as short-run and long-run DD, respectively. This will serve us
to check whether DD elicited over diﬀerent time horizons may
result in diﬀerent associations with behavior (see Materials and
Methods).
In the UG, participants made decisions as both proposers and
responders in random order. We therefore obtained the strategy
proﬁle for each subject consisting of an oﬀer as proposer and a
minimum acceptable oﬀer (MAO) as responder (see Materials
and Methods). By using a UG task in which responders state
their punishment threshold before learning the actual proposal,
i.e., the strategy method (in contrast to the direct-response
method, used by Crockett et al., 2010; see Brandts and Charness,
2011, for a review), we prevented role-speciﬁc time-dependent
eﬀects that would make the eﬀect of DD on choices across
roles incomparable. That is, had we used the direct-response
method, participants would have learnt the ﬁnal outcome from
their own decisions as responders instantly, whereas as proposers
they would have to wait for the responder’s decision in order
to learn the outcome. This would have generated diﬀerent
delays between decision-making and outcome-realization across
roles, which would have been problematic given that in our
analysis we are jointly analyzing the eﬀect of DD on both roles.
Keeping instead by design identical delays between decision and
outcome-realization across roles (by using the strategy method
for the responder), our method preserves the main relationship
of interest comparable.
Results
Delay Discounting and Behavior in the
Ultimatum Game
In Figure 1 we show the mean (± robust SEM clustered by
interviewer) oﬀer (panel A), MAO (panel B), and oﬀer-MAO
(panel C) as a function of diﬀerent DD characterizations. Short-
and long-runDD aremeasured based on the number of impatient
responses (from 0 to 6) the individual made for each of the
FIGURE 1 | Offer, minimum acceptable offer (MAO), and
Offer-MAO by delay discounting (DD) groups. Mean (±robust
SEM clustered by interviewer) offer (A), MAO (B), and offer-MAO
(C) by groups of DD. Both offers and MAOs are plotted in terms
of their deviation from the mean behavior. From left to right and
separated by dashed lines, the short-run, long-run, and combined
DD appear split in terciles (“low,” “med,” and “high” for the first,
second, and third tercile, respectively).
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two subtasks, while “combined DD” refers to the average of
the above DD measures ([DDs+DDl]/2). For visual clarity we
categorized individuals in three groups according to their DD
(as in Espín et al., 2012) and plot oﬀers and MAOs in terms
of their deviation from the mean oﬀer (0.462 ± 0.007) and
MAO (0.350 ± 0.009), deﬁned as a fraction of the pie. Positive
deviations indicate above-average oﬀers or MAOs in each case.
From left to right and separated by dashed lines, the short-
run, long-run, and combined DDs appear split in terciles (“low,”
“med,” and “high” for the bottom, middle, and top tercile,
respectively).
It can be observed that mean oﬀers andMAOs vary along with
DD groups. In particular, more impatient individuals appear to
have on average lower oﬀers and higher MAOs. Interestingly,
these relationships are qualitatively similar regardless of the
DD measure used. The eﬀect of DD is even clearer on the
diﬀerence “oﬀer-MAO,” a variable that serves as a measure
of the margin of agreement each individual allows: the larger
one’s oﬀer and the smaller one’s MAO (thus, the larger the
diﬀerence), the more likely the individual is to agree with
others thus preventing the destruction of the pie. We observe
that more impatient individuals allow a lower margin of
agreement.
To test the statistical signiﬁcance of these relationships,
we performed a series of regressions where the raw DD
scores are introduced as continuous explanatory variables
(mean values of the three UG variables across raw DD
scores are displayed in Supplementary Figures S3 and S4).
Table 1 presents the estimates of the impact of DD on UG
behavioral strategies in columns (1)–(3). Each cell contains
estimates from one separate regression, with the variable at
the top of the column as the dependent variable. In all
regressions we control for socio-demographic variables (age,
gender, marital status, household income, and educational
level), cognitive abilities, risk preferences, and order eﬀects
in decisions as possible confounding factors. Robust standard
TABLE 1 | Impact of DD over UG strategies and expected payoffs.
Dependent vars. Offer MAO Offer-
MAO
Own
payoff
Other’s
payoff
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Short-run DD −0.0294 0.0428∗ −0.0722∗∗ −0.0115 −0.0252∗
(0.157) (0.052) (0.024) (0.131) (0.053)
Long-run DD −0.0324∗∗ 0.0393∗ −0.0717∗∗∗ 0.0018 −0.0269∗∗∗
(0.041) (0.051) (0.004) (0.785) (0.009)
Combined DD −0.0437∗∗ 0.0581∗∗ −0.1018∗∗∗ −0.0070 −0.0369∗∗∗
(0.038) (0.017) (0.002) (0.404) (0.006)
Highdd vs. lowDD −0.0281∗ 0.0431∗∗∗ −0.0711∗∗∗ −0.0069 −0.0231∗∗
(0.052) (0.005) (0.001) (0.215) (0.013)
The estimated coefficients for different DD characterizations as explanatory
variables are shown in rows. Dependent variables are expressed as a fraction of the
pie (€20). Each estimate refers to a different OLS regression with robust standard
errors clustered by interviewer (108 groups) and controlling for age, gender,
married, household income, educational level, mathematical cognitive abilities, risk
preferences, and order effects. N = 713, except for the last row where n = 488.
P-values are shown in brackets (two-tailed). ∗P < 0.10, ∗∗P < 0.05, ∗∗∗P < 0.01.
The complete regressions are presented in Supplementary Tables S1–S4.
errors are clustered on interviewers in order to account
for the non-independence of the observations gathered by
the same pair of interviewers. OLS estimates are shown for
comparability of coeﬃcients (other regressionmethods like Tobit
or ordered models yield similar main results and are available
upon request from the authors) and two-tailed P-values are
presented in brackets. Asterisks denote signiﬁcant estimates.
The complete regressions can be found in Supplementary
Tables S1–S4.
Diﬀerent characterizations of DD are presented in rows. The
ﬁrst, second and third rows show the eﬀect of short-run, long-
run, and combined DD, respectively, on the dependent variables.
To facilitate interpretation, the three measurements of DD are
normalized to the interval [0, 1] so that the reported coeﬃcients
refer to the diﬀerence between the least and the most impatient
individuals, according to each measure. Finally, “highDD vs.
lowDD,” in the fourth row, is a binary variable taking the value
1 if the individual belongs to the top 33% and 0 if the individual
belongs to the bottom 33% of the distribution of “combined
DD.” Observations falling in the central 33% are missing for the
analyses shown in the last row, hence the sample for this last
exercise is reduced to n = 488.
Columns (1), (2), and (3) refer to regressions with the
individual’s oﬀer, MAO, and their diﬀerence as dependent
variables, respectively. These variables are expressed as a fraction
of the pie.
The impact of both short-run and long-run DD on oﬀers
[column (1)] is negative and quantitatively similar, but only
reaches signiﬁcance in the case of long-run DD. As we discuss
in the SI, we cannot disentangle whether this diﬀerence is due
to the fact that the presence of immediate payoﬀs in the short-
run task reduces the predictive power of short-run DD [which
would be in favor of the dual-valuation account of DD and at
the same time prevent an explanation in terms of behavioral
control (Figner et al., 2010)] or to the poor distribution of
subjects’ responses in that subtask (Supplementary Figure S1).
Note that, in any case, we can infer that neither present bias
nor behavioral control is the only factor related to proposers’
behavior since these should not inﬂuence choices in the long-
run DD subtask. A seemingly substitutive eﬀect between short-
run DD and long-run DD (when including both variables in
a single regression their coeﬃcients are still negative but lose
signiﬁcance; not reported) suggests that we will possibly obtain
a better picture by combining both measures. In fact, the variable
“combined DD” reports a slightly stronger eﬀect on oﬀers. The
“highDD vs. lowDD” variable yields a similar result. Thus, the
eﬀect of DD on oﬀers is negative, though rather small (between
2.81 and 4.37% of the pie, i.e., between 18.96 and 29.49%
of one SD of the dependent variable, depending on the DD
speciﬁcation).
On the other hand, all the estimates of DD are positive and
signiﬁcant when the dependent variable is the individual’s MAO
[column (2)]. Hence, we replicate the ﬁnding by Crockett et al.
(2010) to the extent that more impatient responders are more
likely to reject low oﬀers. This result suggests that the inability
to inhibit an immediate response to an aversive stimulus (i.e.,
a negative emotion; see Sanfey et al., 2003; Van’t Wout et al.,
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2006; Tabibnia et al., 2008) is not the only source of impatient
responders’ rejections. The evaluation of short- and long-run
goals should play a crucial role as well since (i) the relationship
also arises under the “cold” strategy method and (ii) both the
long-run DD—which should not depend on executive control—
and the short-run DD similarly predict rejections. The eﬀect of
DD onMAOs is larger than its eﬀect on oﬀers but still quite small
(between 3.93 and 5.81% of the pie, i.e., between 22.22 and 32.84%
of one SD of the dependent variable).
Column (3) shows that the above relationships translate into
a relatively strong eﬀect of DD on “oﬀer-MAO.” This means
that the margin for agreement shrinks as DD increases. It will
therefore be easier to shake hands with a patient individual.
Speciﬁcally, these eﬀects lie between 7.11 and 10.18% of the pie,
that is, between 30.12 and 43.12% of one SD of the dependent
variable. As in the case of oﬀer and MAO, here, we observe as
well that short-run and long-run DD are associated with the same
patterns, and combining the two measures improves the model’s
power of ﬁt.
While Figure 1 provides an illustrative picture with regards
to the eﬀect DD has on bargaining behavior, the estimated
eﬀects and statistical signiﬁcance are properly obtained through
regressions (Table 1). In particular, from both Table 1; Figure 1
we obtain the following:
Result 1: short-run oriented subjects oﬀer less in the UG;
Result 2: short-run oriented subjects reject more, that is, their
MAO is higher.
Consistent with Results 1 and 2, short-run oriented subjects do
not facilitate agreements. Speciﬁcally, the margin for agreement
(oﬀer-MAO) allowed by the most patient individuals virtually
doubles that allowed by the most impatient individuals. (Note
here that both patient and impatient groups display mean oﬀers
well above mean MAOs.)
Taken together, these results lead to a rejection of Hypothesis 1,
according to which impatience should predict individuals’
concern for fairness in either role of the UG, since the oﬀers
made by high-DD proposers are, on average, more unfair. In
terms of the Fehr and Schmidt’s (1999) inequality aversion
model, impatient individuals appear to exhibit stronger aversion
to disadvantageous inequality and weaker aversion to (possibly
even “negative aversion” to, i.e., preference for) advantageous
inequality compared to patient individuals (proposers’ oﬀers are
not only driven by “pure” preferences but also by the avoidance
of rejection, so it would be hard to conclude about the sign of
advantageous-inequality aversion). In the context of the UG, this
would imply that impatient individuals are keen on equalizing
payoﬀs when they are below but unwilling to do so when they are
above, which is consistent with spiteful preferences. Therefore we
do ﬁnd support for Hypothesis 2, according to which impatience
should predict individuals’ spite-based decisions in the UG.
Does the Final Outcome Relate to Individuals’
Delay Discounting?
As stated in the Introduction, however, the above results might
also be explained if high DD predicts less strategic rather
than more spiteful behavior. To disentangle the two, we now
focus on the participants’ payoﬀs. We simulated a perfect
random matching between participants (i.e., like a round-robin
tournament where everybody plays once against everybody in
each role) resulting in 1,424 (712 interacting partners ∗ 2
roles) simulated interactions per subject, and computed their
expected (mean) payoﬀs as a proxy for reproductive ﬁtness.
From an evolutionary viewpoint, this method will actually give
us an appropriate measure for the adaptiveness of the strategies
adopted in the UG, since the probability of matching with each of
the other participants across the city was identical. We obtained
the expected payoﬀ per interaction of each individual (“own
payoﬀ ”) and that of the other individuals when interacting with
her (“other’s payoﬀ ”), which were calculated from the actual
distribution of individual strategies in the sample (see Materials
and Methods). Recall that these expected payoﬀs are calculated
for each individual based on her decisions in both roles (i.e.,
the average across the two roles). Under the interpretation that
impatience goes along with an inability to ﬁgure out how the
distribution of others’ strategies in the sample looks like or
to appropriately respond to others’ behavior (i.e., impatience
reﬂects impaired strategic adaptation), and assuming that patient
and impatient individuals are equally self-interested, impatient
individuals should, by deﬁnition, earn less money. If, on the
other hand, patient and impatient individuals are equally good
at anticipating others’ strategies but impatience predicts a higher
willingness to reduce others’ payoﬀs (i.e., Hypothesis 2), we
should expect that it is the counterpart’s payoﬀ, instead of the
own payoﬀ, that negatively correlates with the impatience of the
decision-maker.
In Figure 2, own payoﬀ (panel A) and other’s payoﬀ (panel
B) are expressed as a fraction of the pie and plotted in terms of
their deviation from the mean payoﬀ (0.430 ± 0.003). The same
categorizations of DD of Figure 1 are employed.
It is nicely illustrated that the struggle will be ﬁercer with
impatient interacting partners since, as impatience increases,
there is a rather strong decrease in other’s payoﬀ, whereas the
variation in own payoﬀ appears to be less pronounced. Again, the
statistical signiﬁcance of these relationships is assessed through
regression analyses with DD as a continuous explanatory variable
(mean values of own payoﬀ and other’s payoﬀ across raw DD
scores are displayed in Supplementary Figure S5).
In column (4) of Table 1 we display the estimates for
regressions with the expected own payoﬀ, expressed as fraction of
the pie, as the dependent variable. None of the DD speciﬁcations
results in signiﬁcant estimates. Thus, based on the analysis of the
expected payoﬀs we do not ﬁnd support for the argument that
high discounters were simply unable to apply an advantageous
(i.e., more adaptive) strategy. Participants with high DD did not
earn less (or more) than participants with lowDD, as participants’
payoﬀs were not signiﬁcantly related to their DD.
Interestingly, however, a salient result is that DD impacts
negatively and signiﬁcantly on other’s payoﬀ according to all DD
speciﬁcations [column (5)]. That is, the higher the DD of an
individual’s interacting partner, the less she is expected to earn
from that interaction. The total eﬀect of DD on other’s payoﬀ
ranges between 2.31 and 3.69% of the pie. Putting these ﬁndings
into an evolutionary perspective and considering the expected
payoﬀs as a measure of potential reproductive ﬁtness, this eﬀect,
Frontiers in Behavioral Neuroscience | www.frontiersin.org 6 August 2015 | Volume 9 | Article 214
Espín et al. Impatience and spite in bargaining
FIGURE 2 | Own and other’s payoff by DD groups. Mean (±robust SEM clustered by interviewer) own payoff (A) and other’s payoff (B) by groups of DD (same
groups as in Figure 1). Both own and other’s mean payoffs are plotted in terms of their deviation from the mean payoff.
although seemingly small, is in fact profound. The 99th and
50th percentiles of the distribution of own payoﬀ are 0.482 and
0.451, respectively; hence, a mere 3.1% reduction in the payoﬀ
is suﬃcient to depress an individual’s ﬁtness from the top to the
median part of the distribution.
Therefore, the strategies adopted by patient and impatient
individuals are equally adaptive but the eﬀects these strategies
have on others are substantially diﬀerent: individuals (either
patient or impatient) will get lower payoﬀs from their interactions
with impatient individuals than from their interactions with
patient individuals. It follows that individuals facing impatient
bargaining partners more often than others will have lower
expected payoﬀs and hence lower survival probabilities as well.
Based on Figure 2 and the regression analyses of Table 1 we
therefore conclude:
Result 3: short-run oriented subjects do not earn less money;
Result 4: the partners of short-run oriented subjects earn less
money.
Given these results, it appears that high-DD individuals are
not less strategic but indeed more spiteful. In other words, the
alternative rationale (i.e., that high-DD individuals’ decisions
reﬂect a diminished capacity to maximize their own payoﬀs
in a strategic setting) fails the test of the individuals’ payoﬀs.
Therefore, from Results 1 to 4, only the spite account for the
observed behavior of impatient individuals (as predicted by
Hypothesis 2) ﬁnds support.
Finally, we look into the role of cognitive abilities in order to
shedmore light on how behavior and payoﬀs are linked with each
other. Although cognitive ability, as measured by the number of
correct answers to ﬁve mathematical questions, and impatience
are unrelated in our sample (regressions using a variety of
model speciﬁcations, both with and without control variables,
as well as parametric and non-parametric correlation analyses
all produce Ps > 0.3; not reported), previous work suggests
that there might be a potential confound (Burks et al., 2009;
Dohmen et al., 2010). This lack of relationship may have to do
with methodological diﬀerences across studies (e.g., the speciﬁc
cognitive measures employed). Supplementary Tables S1–S4 in SI
reveal that subjects endowed with higher cognitive skills achieve a
higher own payoﬀ [P = 0.009 in the regression using “combined
DD”; Supplementary Table S3, column (4)]. However, higher
cognitive abilities also predict higher MAOs [P = 0.029; column
(2)], which is at odds with the payoﬀ maximizing strategy, i.e.,
setting MAO either to zero or to the smallest possible amount.
In addition, cognitive abilities do not predict oﬀers being closer
to the equal split [P > 0.7; column (1)], which in our sample
would be the payoﬀ maximizing strategy. That is, subjects with
higher cognitive abilities succeed in achieving larger total payoﬀs,
as one would expect, but at the same time they do not manifest
payoﬀ maximizing behavior when analyzing each role separately.
Such an observation is important insofar as it shows that the
relationship between the behavioral predictors (cognitive abilities
and DD) and the ﬁnal payoﬀs is not so clear-cut. Concretely,
in our case, what determines subjects’ payoﬀs is the whole
behavioral proﬁle coming from both choices in the UG and the
actual distribution of choices across the city. Thus, observing
higher DD to predict both lower oﬀers (Result 1) and higher
MAOs (Result 2) but not lower payoﬀs (Result 3) should not be
considered a puzzle.
Discussion
The aim of the study was to explore the relationship between
individuals’ intertemporal preferences and bargaining behavior
in the UG. Low oﬀers clearly violate fairness norms but, at
the same time, they provide the perfect ground for spiteful
preferences to manifest (Kirchsteiger, 1994; Jensen, 2010). Our
design, in which subjects play both roles of the UG, allows
us to uncover the preferences that underlie the link between
impatience and rejection behavior (Crockett et al., 2010). We
ﬁnd that high DD predicts spiteful rather than fair strategies
in both roles. These spiteful strategies involve the rejection
of disadvantageous, “unfair” splits, but also the proposal of
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advantageous, “unfair” splits. Quite importantly, this behavioral
pattern by high discounters does not lead them to earn less (i.e.,
their strategies are not less adaptive), but they result instead
in signiﬁcantly lower payoﬀs for those who interact with them.
This is consistent with the observation of Marlowe et al. (2011)
that hunter-gatherers of smaller societies, assumed to strongly
discount the future (Woodburn, 1980), show more spiteful
behavior in the UG. Thus, while reducing others’ payoﬀs appears
to work as a short-run proximate motivation in ultimatum
bargaining, future research should try to determine which
outcome(s) might represent the long-run goal(s). According
to our ﬁndings, the unwillingness to harm others, or the
desire to increase others’ payoﬀs or the joint surplus (reaching
an agreement implies that the pie is not destroyed) are the
most obvious candidates. Short-run orientation has indeed
been related to both aggressive (Nelson and Trainor, 2007;
Espín et al., 2012) and uncooperative (Curry et al., 2008)
patterns.
We interpret this result as evidence that spite-based behavior
responds to short-run psychological satisfaction. However, it
may be argued that living environments favoring local (vs.
global) competition for resources could impose social-ecological
pressures for the selection of both spiteful and short-run
oriented preferences separately (Gardner and West, 2004;
Daly and Wilson, 2005; Hill et al., 2008). Thus, both traits
might serve as cognitive adaptations to environmental cues of
local competition signaling a strong link between individuals’
reproductive success and their short-run relative standing.
In fact, it has been found that exposure to harsh social
conditions during childhood predicts later seemingly spiteful
behavior in a repeated prisoner’s dilemma game (McCullough
et al., 2013), supporting the notion that social preferences are
importantly shaped by daily life circumstances (Van Lange et al.,
1997; Rand and Kraft-Todd, 2014). Similarly, unpredictable
developmental environments may lead to short-run orientation
and other “impulsive” behaviors (Hill et al., 2008). This line
of argument could raise concerns on whether the way we
interpret the relationship between impatience and spiteful
behavior is the only possible one (even though both views are
not necessarily in contradiction), or if instead there exists such
an unobserved third variable driving the result. For example,
other personality traits, which we have failed to measure, might
be also aﬀecting bargaining behavior. Although we control
for a large set of socio-economic characteristics of subjects in
the statistical analyses, this possibility cannot be completely
ruled out in a correlation study. A more systematic approach
to such potentially underlying processes would thus be an
interesting endeavor for future research (Peysakhovich and
Rand, in press, for instance, provide a clever experimental
manipulation that could be adapted to systematically study these
processes).
Based upon previous research (Espín et al., 2012), our
ﬁndings suggest that rejection behavior in the UG might better
resemble the spiteful punishment by free-riders in terms of
its psychological foundations than the moralistic or fairness-
based punishment by cooperators. In eﬀect, the bargaining—
intrinsically conﬂictive—nature of the UG could be generating a
competitive environment, where outperforming the other player
is a primary goal (Fliessbach et al., 2007; Dvash et al., 2010; Bault
et al., 2011). In ultimatum bargaining, both players can make use
of their own forces to prevent the other player from achieving
her goals, thus oﬀering a natural context for the expression
of dominance behavior (Jensen, 2010), which is deeply rooted
in early human cognitive development (Thomsen et al., 2011;
Mascaro and Csibra, 2012). Such an interpretation is to some
extent coherent with recent ﬁndings indicating that the rejection
of low oﬀers may reﬂect a tendency to avoid being subjugated to
the other player (Yamagishi et al., 2012).
Along these lines, Crockett et al. (2013) found that serotonin-
depleted participants were more likely to reject low oﬀers in
the UG, but tended to be less likely to punish low oﬀers as
third-party observers (which is considered to reﬂect a clear
concern for social fairness, see Fehr and Fischbacher, 2004).
Moreover, reducing subjects’ serotonin levels was found to
increase the psychological satisfaction (as measured by striatal
activation) of rejecting low oﬀers in the UG, but to decrease
the satisfaction associated with receiving fair oﬀers. These results
indicate that reduced serotonergic activity predicts retaliatory
motives behind the rejection of low oﬀers in the UG rather than
an enhanced preference for fairness. Our ﬁndings are consistent
with those of Crockett et al. (2013) insofar as there is an intimate
link between low serotonin levels and high DD (Schweighofer
et al., 2008; Crockett et al., 2010). Thus, responders’ retaliatory
behavior triggered by serotonin depletion could reﬂect a short-
run oriented, spiteful desire to reduce the proposer’s payoﬀs.
Taken together, these studies indicate that in the UG not
all of rejection decisions are driven by the notion of fairness.
Accordingly, they add to a growing literature on social dilemma
games (Shinada et al., 2004; Falk et al., 2005; Herrmann et al.,
2008; Gächter and Herrmann, 2009; Rand and Nowak, 2011;
Espín et al., 2012), giving support for the presence, not only of
fairness concerns, but also of competitive spite—a pro-self rather
than pro-social sentiment—as a key psychological ingredient
behind costly punishment.
In social dilemmas, the punishment of free-riders by
cooperators is considered a second-order cooperative behavior as
it is beneﬁcial for the group (Fehr and Gächter, 2002; Gächter
et al., 2008) though not for the punisher (Dreber et al., 2008)
in the long term. However, both empirical (Herrmann et al.,
2008) and theoretical (Rand et al., 2010; Rand and Nowak,
2011) evidence suggests that, under speciﬁc circumstances,
spiteful punishment by free-riders may dramatically challenge the
dynamics of cooperation and the long-run social eﬃciency (for
an overview, see Sylwester et al., 2013). Therefore, special care
has to be taken when using the standard UG (where one cannot
know whether or not the punisher wants to enforce fairness
or take a spiteful, competitive attitude) as a device to study
peer punishment and, on top of that, when building theories
on how individuals, institutions or groups enforce the relevant
social norms based on results from rejection behavior in this
game. Future research should take into account that hyper-
competitiveness (Jensen, 2010) might be as fundamental to the
complexity of human social behavior as ultra-sociality (Richerson
and Boyd, 1998).
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Limitations
Some potential limitations of the present study should be
acknowledged. First, as already mentioned, the correlation
nature of our analysis does not allow drawing ﬁrm conclusions
regarding the causality of the observed relationships, leaving
open alternative interpretations.
Secondly, the hypothetical nature of reward in the discounting
elicitation task should be considered. In particular, even though
it does not seem to be the case in intertemporal choice (e.g.,
Johnson and Bickel, 2002), hypothetical (vs. real) payments
may admittedly aﬀect behavior. Indeed there are many well-
studied examples where this is the case (Slovic, 1969; Holt and
Laury, 2002; Harrison and Rutström, 2008; El Harbi et al., 2015;
see, however, the review by Camerer and Hogarth, 1999, the
main point of which is that “it depends”). On the other hand,
hypothetical reward might potentially be better suited in a face-
to-face experiment like ours that involves choices with immediate
as well as delayed payments, since keeping both the transaction
costs and the level of payment-uncertainty (i.e., whether the
payment will actually be made) equivalent across the diﬀerent
choices is a particularly diﬃcult task. In these cases, there are
good reasons to expect that hypothetical reward might even lead
to less biased estimations (see Read, 2005, for an interesting
discussion on the appropriateness of real incentives). However, it
would be important for future research to test the extent to which
the nature of incentives matters for the relationships studied in
this paper.
Thirdly, it should be noted that due to the restrictions imposed
by the features of our survey-experiment, the DD task employed
was not designed to allow for a precise estimation of the
individuals’ discount rates.Whenever possible researchers should
try to elicit intertemporal preferences more precisely (see the
methods used, for instance, in Burks et al., 2009; Andreoni and
Sprenger, 2012; Andersen et al., 2014; Bradford et al., 2014).
Materials and Methods
Procedures
All participants were respondents of a wider survey-experiment
that was conducted from November 23rd to December 15th 2010
in the city of Granada, Spain, using a door-to-door approach. The
ﬁrst part of the survey included a questionnaire, lasting about
20 min, gathering socio-economic information, as well as risk
preferences and cognitive abilities. Participants then completed
the hypothetical delay-discounting task and upon completion
they made their monetarily incentivized experimental decisions.
Matching and payments took place within the next 2 weeks.
Interviewers were last-year university students, who worked in
pairs. Detailed information regarding the protocol and the exact
content of the survey-experiment can be found in the SI (see also
Exadaktylos et al., 2013).
The Delay-Discounting Task
In the discounting task, participants had to state their willingness
to wait in order to receive a hypothetical monetary payoﬀ. The
participants responded verbally to the decisions presented (also
verbally) by one of the interviewers and their responses were
written down by the second interviewer. In contrast to the UG,
decisions in this task were not incentivized with money for
technical and logistical reasons associated to ﬁeld investigation
(delayed payments, re-contact participants on a speciﬁc date,
etc.). Most importantly, previous studies have shown that real
(versus hypothetical) incentives do not change the distribution
of individual responses in DD tasks either within or between
subjects (Johnson and Bickel, 2002; Madden et al., 2004; Lagorio
and Madden, 2005; however, see Coller and Williams, 1999)
and that intertemporal choices over both real and hypothetical
reward result in identical brain activations (Bickel et al., 2009).
However, since in contrast to the lab, the ﬁeld cannot always
guarantee maximum control, subjects paying less attention to a
purely hypothetical task (Frederick et al., 2002) cannot be ruled
out and can potentially generate nosier data. On the other hand,
we expect that this issue was eased oﬀ by the use of a large sample
size. Thus, while we do not think that the use of hypothetical
incentives has aﬀected the sign of the relationships under study,
it might have aﬀected their size. In fact, as reported in Section
“Results,” some of our observed eﬀects are not large in size, and
hypothetical incentives may be partly responsible.
Participants were asked to choose between sooner-smaller
reward and larger, but more delayed reward in a series of
binary decisions. The larger the delayed amount needed for
“convincing” an individual to wait, the higher her DD score (i.e.,
her impatience). We used the following protocol:
• The short-run DDwasmeasured by having participants choose
between €5 available “today” and €5+X (X = €0, . . ., €5) to be
received “tomorrow.”
• For the long-run DD, the six choices were between €150
delayed by 1 month and €150+X (X = €0, . . ., €100) delayed
by 7 months (see SI).
The average number of impatient responses (i.e., the number
of times individuals chose the sooner-smaller reward, out of six)
was 2.75± 0.127 (robust SEM clustered by interviewer to account
for dependency between the observations gathered by the same
interviewers, leaving a total of 108 independent groups) in the
short-run subtask and 3.16 ± 0.087 in the long-run one (see
Supplementary Figure S1 for the distribution of choices in the DD
subtasks).
According to dual-valuation neurobiological theories of DD
(McClure et al., 2004, 2007; built on the models introduced by
Phelps and Pollak, 1968; Laibson, 1997), these two measures
could capture diﬀerent components of the psychological
evaluation of delayed reward because the long-run subtask did
not involve trading-oﬀ immediate payoﬀs. That is, the so-called
present bias should aﬀect subjects’ choices in the short-run but
not in the long-run subtask (see SI)5. In contrast, single-valuation
5Interestingly the anterior cingulate cortex, a brain region frequently associated
with the presence of response conﬂict (e.g., Barch et al., 2001), has been found to
be more strongly activated during choices between immediate and delayed reward
than between only delayed reward (McClure et al., 2007). This might reﬂect the
conﬂict between the two valuation systems, which should interact only when one
of the options is immediate.
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theories (e.g., Kable and Glimcher, 2007) claim for a unique
process underlying the evaluation of delayed and immediate
reward. While they diﬀer in the number of interacting processes
at play, both of these accounts locate the underlying neural
system of intertemporal choice within the valuation regions of
the brain (such as the ventral striatum and the ventromedial
prefrontal cortex).
A diﬀerent strand of research, however, highlights the
distinction between “impulsive action” and “impulsive choice”
(see Broos et al., 2012; Paterson et al., 2012; Bari and Robbins,
2013 for a review)6. Accordingly, impatient choices in DD tasks
can result not only from a higher subjective valuation of the
sooner over the latter option but also from an inability to
overcome the temptation of choosing the former, that is, to
exert behavioral control over a prepotent response, irrespective
of its relative valuation (Figner et al., 2010; Hare et al., 2014;
Steinbeis et al., 2014). Behavioral control has been traditionally
related to executive brain areas in the lateral and particularly
the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (Miller and Cohen, 2001). Our
task should also allow us to shed light on the potential role of
behavioral control since its eﬀect on intertemporal choice appears
to be restricted to trials were the sooner option is immediate
(Figner et al., 2010). Thus, participants’ choices in the long-
run subtask should not be inﬂuenced by executive but only by
valuation processes.
In sum, if we ﬁnd that both short-run and long-run DD
relate similarly to behavior in the UG, it would be diﬃcult to
argue that the eﬀect of DD is due to individual diﬀerences in
either present bias or the capacity to exert behavioral control.
The Spearman’s rank order correlation between the number
of impatient responses in short-run and long-run subtasks is
0.302 (P < 0.001). This far-from-perfect correlation opens a
door for the two measures to be actually capturing diﬀerent
psychological constructs and, consequently, having distinct
associated behaviors (see SI for a discussion on this issue). That
said, it should be noted that the two subtasks also involve diﬀerent
payoﬀ magnitudes (€5–€10 vs. €150–€250) and time delays (1 day
vs. 6 months). Therefore, a potential magnitude eﬀect (i.e., larger
payoﬀs are discounted less than smaller payoﬀs, see for example
Green and Myerson, 2004) or diﬀerences in time perception (i.e.,
time is perceived non-linearly, see Bradford et al., 2014) could
also lead to diﬀerences across subtasks that are not strictly due to
dual-valuation or diﬀerences in behavioral control7.
In the literature on DD, there is a long-lasting discussion
regarding which particular functional form best characterizes
individuals’ discounting. While some scholars suggest that
discount rates are constant (i.e., exponential, time-consistent
6“Impulsive choice” refers to choosing the sooner option in DD tasks, while
“impulsive action” refers to the inability to inhibit a prepotent response.
7Reviewer #3 called our attention to these two potential confounding factors
and suggested that therefore the employed task does not permit making any
inferences regarding dual-valuation theories whatsoever.While acknowledging the
limitations of the task, we do consider that we can discuss about the dual-valuation
theories since their main argument is that making intertemporal choices where one
of the options is immediate engages—by deﬁnition—both valuation systems, while
choosing between two delayed options engages only one of the two systems (see
SI). Yet, due to these limitations we have avoided making any strong claims in this
regard when discussing the results.
discounting) others argue that discount rates decline over time
[i.e., a (quasi-) hyperbolic functional form, which involves time-
inconsistent preferences; see Frederick et al., 2002; Green and
Myerson, 2004]. Due to the restrictions imposed by the nature
of our survey-experiment, however, the discounting elicitation
task was not designed to allow us estimate the parameters of
the individuals’ discount functions. Consequently, an in-depth
analysis of the prevalence of constant versus declining discount
rates cannot be performed.
The Ultimatum Game
In the UG, all participants made decisions as both proposers
and responders in random order. The pie to split was €20
(≈$27). A double blind procedure was employed by means of
a decision card that was introduced in a sealed envelope by
the participant after writing down her decisions. As proposers,
participants were asked to state which share of the €20 (in 10%
increments) they wanted to oﬀer to an anonymous partner. As
responders, participants were asked to accept or reject each of
the following proposals (proposer’s payoﬀ, responder’s payoﬀ):
(€20, €0), (€18, €2), (€16, €4), (€14, €6), (€12, €8), (€10, €10),
that is, the strategy method was employed (Mitzkewitz and
Nagel, 1993). This allowed the elicitation of each participant’s
MAO.
Apart from the obvious advantage of eliciting the full strategy
proﬁle for every participant, employing the strategy instead of the
direct-response method allowed for the following crucial features
of our design. First, as already discussed in the Introduction,
the direct-response method would have eventually generated
diﬀerent time-dependent eﬀects across roles, thus preventing a
clear interpretation of the results. Second, under the strategy
method, the outcome of the decision a participant made ﬁrst
(either proposer or responder, randomly chosen) could not
have inﬂuenced her behavior at the second decision. Third,
an alternative rationale behind a potential positive relationship
between rejections and impatience (predicted by both Hypothesis
1 and 2) is based on the inability of impatient responders’
to inhibit prepotent responses8. The strategy method arguably
reduces the scope for such an interpretation since responders
decide in a rather “cold” state. In any case, our DD task may
allow us to disentangle if the eﬀect of DD on rejections is driven
by behavioral control (in which case rejections should not be
predicted by the long-run DD).
Hence, through our experimental protocol we obtained the
strategy proﬁle for each subject consisting of an oﬀer as
proposer and a MAO as responder. After making their decisions,
participants were randomly paired in order to calculate the
real payoﬀs according to their chosen strategies and those of
their counterparts. Thus, subjects were playing a one-shot, dual-
role, simultaneous UG (see Supplementary Figure S2 for the
distribution of choices in the game). One out of every ten
participants was randomly selected for real payment (see SI).
8It must be noted, however, that neurobiological results on the inﬂuence of
executive function on UG rejections under the direct-response method have led
to ostensibly contradictory interpretations (e.g., Sanfey et al., 2003; Knoch et al.,
2006; Tabibnia et al., 2008).
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Expected Payoffs
In order to explore the relationship between an individual’s DD
and both her own and her partners’ earnings, we will analyze the
participants’ expected payoﬀs. This analysis will help to uncover
potential diﬀerences in strategic (vs. spite-based) behavior across
DD groups. As described by Iranzo et al. (2012) and Rand et al.
(2013), the average payoﬀ for individual i (with oﬀer = oi and
MAO = mi) after interacting in both roles with individual j (oj,
mj) is given by (a) 1/2(1-oi+oj) if oi ≥ mj and oj ≥ mi; (b) 1/2(1-oi)
if oi ≥ mj and oj < mi; (c) 1/2oj if oi < mj and oj ≥ mi; and (d)
0 if oi < mj and oj < mi. Hence, the expected “own payoﬀ ” for
individual i is calculated by weighting each of these four possible
payoﬀs by the probability of that speciﬁc case occurring within
our sample (i.e., its relative frequency)9 . Analogously, the average
payoﬀ for individual i’s partner (i.e., individual j; the “other”)
in the same cases is (a) 1/2(1-oj+oi); (b) 1/2oi; (c) 1/2(1-oj); and
(d) 0. The expected “other’s payoﬀ ” for individual i is calculated
by assigning weights (same as above) to the latter payoﬀs, and
reﬂects the payoﬀ an individual expects to get when interacting
with individual i (see SI, where we also provide a numerical
example of how the expected payoﬀs are practically calculated).
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